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I. Introduction 
Before 1993 software was generally considered to be unpatentable 
subject matter and the pr otection of software innovations was limited to 
copyright and trade secrets law.  But in late 1993, the Federal Circuit in In 
re Alappat recognized for the f irst time that software-implemented 
inventions could constitute patent eligible subject matter. Fueled by the 
Internet boom in the late 1990s, the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (“PTO”) started issuing software patents in earnest and the Federal 
Circuit ultimately upheld the patentabilty of software-implemented business 
method in its seminal decision in State Street.  During the subsequent decade, 
tens of thou sands of business method patents were granted.  But the 
newfound patentability of software was also met with increasing criticism of 
the quality of the patents granted by the PTO.  To make matters worse, a new 
class of patent asserters, disparagingly referred to as “patent trolls,” began 
enforcing business method patents in increasing numbers, often using the 
cost of litigation as leverage to extract royalty payments from Internet 
companies.  By the time of the financial crisis at the end of the last decade, 
patent reform efforts targeting patent trolls and their favorite tool, business 
method patents, were in full swing.  The se efforts ultimately led to the 
enactment of the America Invents Act (“AIA”) in 2012 that introduced new 
tools to challenge business method patents before the PTO.  In parallel, the 
In Re Bilski case made its way through the courts, ultimately reaching the 
Supreme Court.  In that case, patentability of business methods narrowly 
survived by a 5-4 vote.  Yet, the table was set for ending the era of business 
method patents.  In subsequent decisions in Mayo and, ultimately, Alice, the 
Supreme Court clarified its precedent on the exception to patent eligibility 
for abstract ideas, effectively eliminating patent protection for business 
method patents.  But the impact of Alice went far beyond business method; 
subsequent decisions by the Federal Circuit and the lower courts have 
applied the Alice test to all types of software patents, creating a much more 
restrictive set of rules for patent eligibility of software implemented 
inventions.  This article traces the evolution of the rules for software patent 
eligibility from Alappat to Alice and then analyzes the current state of the 
law in light of the F ederal Circuit post-Alice decisions and its pote ntial 
impact on the intellectual property protection for software going forward. 
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II. Background 
U.S. Patent Act, 35. U.S.C. § 101, defines the subject matter eligible for 
patent protection: 
 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of m atter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.1 
 
The statute recites four categories of patent-eligible subject matter: 
processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.2  The 
Supreme Court has identified three categories of subjec t matter that are 
unpatentable, namely laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas: “Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and 
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools 
of scientific and technological work.”3  The “monopolization of those tool s 
through the grant of a patent might tend to im pede innovation more 
than it would  tend to promote it.”4  However, “too broad an interpretation 
of this exclusionary principle would eviscerate patent law” as “all 
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”5 
The Supreme Court has held that mathematical algorithms, for example, 
are not patentable subject matter to the extent that they are merely 
abstract ideas.6  Sim ply stated, the Diehr Court held that certain types of 
mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than 
abstract ideas until reduced to some type of practical application. 
A.  Alappat: Software Implemented Inventions Could Be Patent Eligible 
In In re Alappat, the Federal Circuit ruled that the claimed subject 
matter was patentable rejecting the PTO’s argument that it was not because 
it still “read on” a general purpose computer even though it was programmed 
to perform according to the subject claim.7  The Alappat invention related 
 
 1.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
 2.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 3.  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 4.  Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 7.  In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544–45 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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to a means for creating a smooth waveform display in a digital oscilloscope, 
that is, a m eans to illuminate pixels on a sc reen that will eliminate any 
apparent discontinuity, jaggedness, or oscillation in the waveform, thus 
giving the visual appearance of a sm ooth continuous waveform. The 
PTO rejected the inv ention because the challen ged method claim was 
directed towards nonstatutory subject matter under the mathematical 
algorithm exception to Section 101.8 When Alappat was decided, courts 
were applying some variation of the Freeman-Walter two-part test 
developed in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to determine 
whether any part of a claim recites mathematical subject matter.9 Under 
Freeman-Walter, courts (1) analyze whether a mathematical algorithm is 
directly or indirectly recited, and (2) if a mathematical algorithm is found, 
whether the claim as a whole applies the algorithm in any manner to physical 
elements or process steps.10  G uided by Freeman-Walter, the Alappat 
majority held: 
 
[T]he proper inquiry in dealing with t he so c alled mathematical 
subject matter exception of § 101 alleged herein is to see whether the 
claimed subject matter as a whole is a disembodied mathematical 
concept, whether categorized as a m athematical formula, 
mathematical equation, mathematical algorithm, or the like, which in 
essence represents nothing more than a “law of nature,” “natural 
phenomenon,” or “abstract idea.” If so, Diehr precludes the patenting 
of that subject matter.11 
 
For Alappat, the F ederal Circuit did not f ind a “disembodied 
mathematical concept which may be characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ 
but rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible 
result.”12  F urthermore, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the PTO’s 
reasoning that the challenged claim was unpatentable because it “ reads on 
a general purpose digital computer ‘means’ to perform the va rious steps 
under program control,” that is, a programmed general purpose computer 
 
 8.  Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 65 (defining “mathematical algorithm” as a “procedure for 
solving a given type of mathematical program”). 
 9.  Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544. 
 10.  Id. at 1544 (citing In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915 (C.C.P.A. 1982)). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
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performing steps of a method.13  Instead, the Federal Circuit held that “such 
programming creates a new machine, because a general purpose computer 
in effect becomes a spec ial purpose computer once it is programmed to 
perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program 
software.”14 Consequently, a “computer operating pursuant to software may 
represent patentable subject matter,” for example, in Alappat, where the 
physical structure (i.e., the computer) used a mathematical algorithm (i.e., 
the programmed software) to transform the display screen in to a state that 
created smooth waveforms rather than jagged ones.15 
B.  State Street: Abstract Concepts Transformed or Performed By a 
Machine 
The Federal Circuit attempted to define the scope of the Supreme 
Court’s “practical application” requirement in State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Fin. Group, Inc. holding that Section 101 allowed claims on 
mathematical algorithms that produced a “useful, concrete, and tangible 
result.”16 In so holding, it affirmed the patentability of patent claims for a 
computerized system that allowed an administrator of a hedge fund/
investment firm to manage multiple mutual funds in a single account, to 
monitor and record financial information among numerous stock portfolios, 
and to quickly calculate certain values, such as the value of the shares to 
the nearest penny.  To the Federal Circuit, the patented invention 
represented: 
 
the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by 
a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final 
share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical 
algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces ‘a useful, 
concrete and tangible result’ — a final share price momentarily fixed 
for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied 
upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.17  
 
 
 13.  Id. at 1544–45. 
 14.  Id. at 1545. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Group., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 17.  Id. 
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In short, the State Street Bank decision found mathematical algorithms, an 
abstract concept, patentable if “transformed” or “performed” by a machine 
and which provided “useful, concrete, and tangible” results. 
Decided in the midst of the dot.com or Internet bubble, the State Street 
Bank decision caused a rush to the PTO ushering in a generation of business 
method patents, Internet patents, and software patents. The PTO classifies 
these patents under Class 705, which is a “generic class for apparatus and 
corresponding methods for performing data processing operations, in which 
there is a significant change in the data or f or performing calculation 
operations wherein the apparatus or method is uniquely designed for or 
utilized in the practice, administration, or management of an enterprise, or 
in the processing of financial data.” Applications for Class 705 patents, 
especially business method patents involving e-commerce, increased from 
1,320 in 1998 to nearly 8,000 by 2001.18  Statistics maintained by the PTO 
further illustrate the astounding increase in business method and Internet 
patent applications and their issuance:19 
 
Year Class 705 
Serialized Filings 
Class 705 CPA-RCE-
R129 Filings 
Class 705 Total 
Filings 
Class 705 
Issues 
2002 6,774 626 7400 494 
2003 6,387 1,310 7,697 486 
2004 6,681 1,731 8,412 291 
2005 6,976 2,056 9,032 711 
2006 8,352 2,532 10,884 1,195 
2007 9,843 2,925 12,778 1,333 
2008 10,293 4,234 14,527 1,643 
2009 8,229 7,160 15,389 1,725 
2010 8,495 8,736 17,231 3,649 
 
 
 18.  Starling Hunter, Have Business Method Patents Gotten a Bum Rap? Some Empirical 
Evidence, MIT SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 1, 2 (2003), http://ebusiness.mit.edu/ 
research/papers/182_hunter_method_patents.pdf. 
 19.  United States Patent and Trademark Office, Class 705 Application Filing and Patents 
Issued Data (2011), http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-patent-
applications/utility-patent/business-methods-18. 
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C.  Bilski: “Process” Under Section 101 
In the Fall of 2008 the Federal Circuit In re Bilski, clarified the standards 
applicable in determining whether a claimed method constitutes a statutory 
“process” under Section 101.20  The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of 
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”) of in eligibility and 
summarized the essence of the claimed method as follows: 
 
In essence, the claim is for a method of hedging risk in the field of 
commodities trading. [. . .] The claimed method envisions an 
intermediary, the “commodity provider,” that sells coal to the power 
plants at a fixed price, thus isolating the power plants from the 
possibility of a spike in demand increasing the price of coal above the 
fixed price.  The same provider buys coal from mining companies at 
a second fixed price, thereby isolating the mining companies from the 
possibility that a drop in demand would lower prices below that fixed 
price.  And the provider has thus hedged its risk; if demand and prices 
skyrocket, it has sold coal at a disadvantageous price but has bought 
coal at an advantageous price, and vice versa if demand and prices 
fall.  Importantly, however, the claim is not  limited to transactions 
involving actual commodities, and the application discloses that the 
recited transactions may simply involve options, i.e., rights to 
purchase or sell the commodity at a particular price within a particular 
timeframe.21 
 
Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s summary of the claimed method 
highlights why such claims should n ot be patented as it describes not a 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter or a ne w and useful 
process, but a “transformation of ‘non-physical financial risks and legal 
liabilities of the commodity provider, the consumer, and the market 
participants.’”22  Sta ted differently, the claimed method was simply a 
computerized manifestation or representation of fundamental principles 
concerning financial risk and legal liabilities.  A monopoly on such a 
claim would “pre-empt[ ] all uses of [that] fundamental principle in all 
fields,” a clue indicating that the claim is not limited to a particular 
application of the pr inciple.23  That the claimed method was performed on 
computer was not enough to save it because “extra-solution activity” and 
 
 20.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949. 
 21.  Id. at 950. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 957; see Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193, (abstract ideas are not patentable until reduced to 
some type of practical application). 
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“insignificant postsolution activity will not transform an unpatentable 
principle into a patentable process.”24 
In re Bilski set forth the machine-or-transformation test previously 
articulated in State Street.  Under this test, an applicant may show that a 
process claim satisfies §101 either by showing that his claim is tied to a 
particular machine, or by showing that the claim transforms an article.25  The 
machine-part of the test requires that the “use of a specific machine or 
transformation of an article must impose meaningful limits on the claim’s 
scope” and “must not merely be insignificant extra-solution activity.”26  
The transformation part of the test states that a process is patent-eligible if it 
“transforms an article into a different state or thing” whe re the 
transformation is “ central to the purpose of the claimed process.”27  The 
Federal Circuit reiterated the traditional transformations of physical objects, 
substances and raw materials through chemical processes or other physical 
acts.  It also acknowledged the fact that the “raw materials of many 
information-age processes, however, are electronic signals and 
electronically-manipulated data,” including, for example, the business 
methods for “manipulat[ing] [ ] even more abstract constructs such as legal 
obligations, organizational relationships, and business risks.”28 But without 
further discussion on the transformation and/or use of raw materials of the 
information age, the Federal Circuit simply stated “that future developments 
in technology and the sciences may present difficult challenges to the 
machine-or-transformation test,”29 leaving those challenges to the Supreme 
Court. 
For now, in articulating this machine-to-transformation test, the Federal 
Circuit concluded, “[s]o long as the claimed process is limited to a practical 
application of a fundamental principle to transform specific data, and the 
claim is limited to a visual depiction that represents specific physical objects 
 
 24.  Id. (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 ( 1978) 
(“The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can 
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance.”); In 
re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding a simple recordation step in the middle of 
the claimed process incapable of imparting patent-eligibility under § 101); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 
835, 839–40 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding a presolution step of gathering data incapable of 
imparting patent-eligibility under § 101). 
 25.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 956. 
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or substances, there is no danger that the scope of the claim would wholly 
pre-empt all uses of the principle.”30 
Judge Newman dissented, accusing the majority of “redefining the 
word ‘process’ in the patent statute, to exclude all processes that do not 
transform physical matter or that are not performed by machines” with little 
regard for its impact on the future or the “ thousands of patents already 
granted.” 31  He argued that such exclusion precludes inventions that “apply 
today’s electronic and photonic technologies, as well as other processes that 
handle data and information in novel ways.”32  According to Judge Newman, 
neither statute nor Supreme Court precedent supported the majority’s 
opinion that transformation of physical state is a requirement of eligibility 
set by Section 101 unless a machine performs the process. 
The Supreme Court reversed holding that Federal Circuit’s machine-
or-transformation test was not the sole test to be used for determining the 
patentability of a “process” under Section 101.33  Nothing in Section 100(b) 
of the Patent Act requires “process, art or method” to transform an article 
or be tied to a m achine.  The Federal Circuit’s adoption of the machine-
or-transformation test as the sole te st for what constitutes a “process” 
violated principles of statutory construction because it allowed an 
interpretation that was beyond the ordinary, contemporary and common 
meaning of the term “process.” 
However, rather than wholly dismissing the machine-or-transformation 
test, the Supreme Court considered it a n important clue or investigative 
tool for determining patentability.  But this tool was unnecessary to render 
the claimed patent unpatentable.  In Bilski, the representative claims 
described a “fundamental economic practice” and reduced it to a 
mathematical formula.34  Thus, as prior precedence has established, even if 
a process or practice was tied to a machine or transforming an article, 
Section 101 still does not capture “fundamental economic practice[s] long 
prevalent in our system of commerce.”35 According to the Supreme Court, 
the claims were merely a recitation of an ineligible concept. 
 
 30.  Id. at 963. 
 31.  Id. at 976 (Newman J., dissenting). 
 32.  Id. (Newman J., dissenting). 
 33.  Bilski v Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601-04 (2010). 
 34.  Id. at 611. 
 35.  Id. 
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D.  Congressional Response to Patents Related to Financial Products or 
Services 
Meanwhile, Congress was trying to resolve the overwhelming number 
of business method patents by creating procedures for their review. The 
America Invents Act replaced inter partes reexaminations with three new 
proceedings: inter partes review (“IPR”), covered business method patent 
review (“CBM”), and post-grant review. 
Congressional debates made clear that this new CBM review procedure 
was targeting the type of abstract patents that the Supreme Court had 
oscillated about.36   Indeed, when asked by Senator Mark Pryor to clarify the 
purpose of the Schumer-Kyl program in the America Invents Act, Senator 
Patrick responded: 
 
The Schumer-Kyl program addresses certain business method 
patents and does not target any specific patents.  The Schumer-Kyl 
program is intended to provide a cost-effective alternative to 
litigation to examine business-method patents.37 
 
Senator Pryor followed up with a pointed question as to whether this 
new provision of the America Invents Act “[was] simply trying to address 
the problem of business method patents of du bious validity that are 
commonly associated with the Federal Circuit’s 1998 decision in State Street 
Bank v. Signature?”38  To which, Senator Leahy responded: 
 
That is correct.  It is still unclear whether the subject matter of these 
patents qualifies as patentable subject matter under current law.  
Patents of low quality and dubious validity, as you know, are a drag 
on innovation because they grant a monopoly right for an invention 
that should not be entitled to one under the patent law.39 
 
Congress’s response to the threat of invalid business method patents and 
their strain on the economy was to enact a “transitional program” called the 
Covered Business Method Review.40  It is transitional because this type of 
 
 36.  157 CONG. REC. S1175 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2011) 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  AIA § 18(a)(3) (2011). 
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proceeding became available in 2012 but will end on September 15, 2020.41 
Under this adversarial proceeding, an accused infringer can participate after 
the filing of the petition for review of a covered business patent,42 unlike the 
now defunct ex parte reexamination procedures. 
The procedural differences between CBM review as compared to inter 
partes review highlight the low tolerance Congress apparently has for 
business method patents. For example, motions to stay  litigation pending 
CBM reviews are more likely to be granted because courts are statutorily 
required to consider four factors: (1) undue prejudice or clear tactical 
advantage; (2) simplification of issues; (3) state of litigation; and (4) whether 
stay (or denial) of the C MB, will in fact reduce the burden of litigation.43  
Furthermore, the PTO may consider more potentially invalidating evidence.  
For example, inter partes review permits challenges to patents using only 
prior art patents or prior art printed publications; whereas CBM review 
allows third parties to challenge issued patents related to financial products 
or services using prior art patents, printed publications, and prior art systems 
— permitting challenges on any ground that is a condition for patentability.44 
These requirements and pe rmissions are special to covered business method 
patents, reflecting Congress’s grievances against them: (1) business method 
patents are a strain on the economy and must be stifled; and (2) allowing parties 
to go first through the PTO provides the PTO an opportunity to conduct a “do-
over” or “fix” the fact that they issued the otherwise dubious business method 
patent in the first place. 
E.  Mayo: The Interplay Between Novelty and Subject Matter Eligibility 
On the heels of the AIA, the Supreme Court issued its 2012 decision 
in Mayo.45  While it was already determined that claims setting forth laws 
of nature are ineligible, the Mayo Court asked whether the claim added more 
than simply “inform[ing] a relevant audience” about what they presumably 
 
 41.  37 C.F.R. § 42.300(d) (2012). 
 42.  A “covered business method” patent is defined as “a patent that claims a method or 
corresponding apparatus for performing data processing operations utilized in th e practice, 
administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not 
include patents for technological inventions.”  AIA § 18(d). 
 43.  AIA § 18(b)(1) 
 44.  Jason E. Stach, Exploring the Expanding Scope of Covered Business Method Reviews, 
FINNEGAN INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. (Jan. 2014), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/ 
articlesdetail.aspx?news=64c9f230-94ab-4d99-b256-9bff462cb8e8. 
 45.  Mayo 132 S. Ct. at 1289. 
ALICE - FINAL_TOMLASTLOOK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2016  2:41 PM 
12 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1 
 
already knew, such as steps that “consist of well understood, routine, 
conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community.”46  In 
Mayo, the Supreme Court unanimously invalidated a method patent 
concerning a blood diagnostic test. 
The Supreme Court held that the patent claimed laws of nature — 
namely, the relationship between, (1) the concentrations of certain 
metabolites in the  blood and (2) the likelihood that a dosage of a drug 
(thiopurine drug) will prove ineffective for a given metabolite concentration.  
Claim 1, for example, states that if the levels of 6-TG in the blood (of a 
patient who has taken a dose of a thiopurine drug) exceed about 400 pmol 
per 8×108 red blood cells, then the administered dose is likely to produce 
toxic side effects.  Even if the intervening act of administering the thiopurine 
drug is required to trigger the side e ffect, the side e ffect itself is still a 
physical manifestation of the r elationship between the drug and the 
particular person in a particular metabolic state.  In other words, the 
relationship exists apart from any human action since it is simply a 
consequence of the wa ys in which thiopurine compounds are metabolized 
by the body.  This, the Court determined is an entirely natural process.  And 
consequently, a patent that simply describes such natural processes, 
including its relation to the physical world (i.e., its interaction with the 
human body) is ineligible subject matter.  With Mayo, the Supreme Court 
“set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible 
applications of those concepts.”47 
III. “Alice: “Significantly More” to Qualify as an “Inventive 
Concept” 
The rule against patenting an abstract idea, mathematical algorithms, or 
a law of nature was not new when Mayo was decided in 2012.  When such 
abstract concepts are wrapped about a machine or built into a process, Mayo 
asked what more did the claim add to the relevant field?48  Does the alleged 
invention simply add steps that “consist of well understood, routine, 
conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community?”49 
 
 46.  Id. at 1298. 
 47.  Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). 
 48.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298. 
 49.  Id. 
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In late 2014, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the guidelines set forth in 
Mayo vis-à-vis Section 101 patentability in its opinion concerning the 
eligibility of a computer-based patent.50  The Supreme Court “set forth a 
framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible 
applications of those concepts.”51  That two-step framework is as follows: 
 
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of 
those patent-ineligible concepts.  If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is 
there in the claims before us?” To answer that question, we consider 
the elements of each claim both individually and “as an ordered 
combination” to determine whether the additional elements “transform 
the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application. 
 
We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an 
‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an element or combination of elements 
that is ‘ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to 
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’52 
 
Specifically, Alice reaffirmed the two step framework espoused in 
Mayo for determining patentability: (1) whether the claim is dir ected to 
an abstract idea; and (2) if an abstract idea is present in the claim, 
determining whether any part of the claim amounts to signif icantly more 
than the abstract idea to qualify as an “inventive concept.”  If not, the claim 
is deemed patent ineligible. 
The Supreme Court found Alice’s patents unpatentable because the 
patents did not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract concept of 
managing risk by using a generic computer.  In so holding, however, Alice 
left open the nature of the technological improvement that must exist before 
an application of an abstract concept may be patentable as “inventive.” 
A.  Federal Circuit Cases Decided in the Immediate Aftermath of Alice 
The Federal Circuit’s application of Alice provides some guidance to 
the conundrums discussed above.  The patent in Digitech v. Electronics for 
Imaging, concerned a process for creating an “improved device profile” that 
described the color and spatial properties of imaging devices that w ould 
allow a more accurate translation of an image’s pixel data for use across 
 
 50.  Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
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different digital image processing devices (i.e., digital cameras, monitors, 
TVs, printers, etc.).53  In Digitech, the Federal Circuit affirmed summary 
judgment of invalidity of the claim, “reciting a process of taking two data 
sets and combining them into a single data set, the device profile.”54  
Digitech’s argument that the claimed “device profile” is subjec t matter 
eligible because it is “‘hardware or  software w ithin a digital i mage 
processing system’ and exists as a tag file appended to a digital image”55 
could not defeat the fact that the claims “encompass all embodiments of the 
information contained in the device profile, regardless of the process through 
which this information is obtained or the physical medium in which it is 
stored.”56  Alice reaffirmed that fundamental concepts are ineligible abstract 
ideas.  And to determine whether a pr ocess claim recites an abst ract idea 
requires looking at the claim as a whole “keeping in mind that an invention 
is not ineligible just because it relies upon a law of  nature or mathematical 
algorithm.”57  However, “[d]ata in its ethereal, non-physical form is simply 
information”58 and the patented claim “recites an ineligible abstract process 
of gathering and combining data that does not require input from a physical 
device.”59 
Judge Hughes, who was on the Digitech panel, authored anot her 
decision in Planet Bingo, in which the Federal Circuit affirmed summary  
judgment of invalidity of a claim directed to “managing a bingo game while 
allowing a player to repeatedly pla y the same sets of num bers in multiple 
sessions.”60  The claim generally recites: 
 
storing a play er’s preferred sets  of bi ngo numbers; retrieving one 
such set upon demand, and playing that set; while simultaneously 
tracking the player’s sets, tracking player payments, and verifying 
winning numbers.61 
 
 
 53.  Digitech v. Electronics for Imaging, 758 F.3d 1344, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 54.  Id. at 1351. 
 55.  Id. at 1349–50. 
 56.  Id. 
 57. Id. at 1350. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1351. 
 60. Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x. 1005, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
 61. Id. at 1006. 
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The district court conclu ded that the method claims enco mpass the 
abstract idea of managing and playing the game of Bingo and that the “use 
of a computer in the method claims ‘adds nothing more than t he ability to 
manage . . . Bingo more efficiently.’”62  And as the district court correctly 
concluded, managing a game of Bingo “consists solely of mental steps which 
can be carried out by a human using pen and paper.”63 
In affirming the invalidity of the patent, the Federal Circuit rejected two 
arguments by plaintiff.  First, because the claimed invention at most required 
two sets of Bingo numbers, a pla yer and a m anager, the Federa l Circuit 
rejected plaintiff’s argument that “‘in real world use, literally thousands, if 
not millions of preselected Bingo num bers are handled by  the claimed 
computer program,’ making it impossible for the invention to be carried out 
manually.”64  Second, because the claimed invention recited a program  
requiring generic functions of storing, retrieving, and verifying a chosen set 
of bingo numbers against a winning set of bingo numbers, the Federal Circuit 
rejected plaintiff’s argument that the accounting, ticketing, and verification 
programs included in the Bingo program offered, added “significantly more” 
than an abstract idea requirement.65 
Two observations follow from these rejections: First, even though the 
real world product itself may contain more complex or possibly inventive 
features, this offers no reprieve to the patent holder who opted f or broader 
patent claims.  Second, the Federal Circuit refused to address how a “claimed 
invention requiring m any transactions might tip the scale s of patent 
eligibility.”66  In other words, would a patent that requires a co mputer’s 
ability to make thousands of computations where such computations could 
not be mentally performed or carried out  by a human using pen and paper 
with comparable accuracy and speed, pass Alice muster?  The Court in 
Planet Bingo left this scenario unanswered. 
A couple of weeks after the decision in Planet Bingo was reached, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed that a patent “directed  to creating fam iliar 
commercial arrangements by use of computers and networks” was ineligible 
 
 62. Id. at 1007. 
 63. Id. at 1006 (citing Planet Bingo v. VKGS, LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 840, 851 (W.D. Mich. 2013)). 
 64. Id. at 1008. 
 65. Id. at 1009. 
 66. Id. at 1008. 
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under Section 101.67  The first clai m is an independent clai m reciting a 
method in which: 
 
(1) a computer operated by the provider of a safe transaction service 
receives a request for a performance guarantee for an “ online 
commercial transaction”; (2) the computer processes the request by 
underwriting the requesting party in order to provide the transaction 
guarantee service; and (3) the c omputer offers, via a “computer 
network,” a transaction guaranty that binds to the transaction upon 
the closing of the transaction.68 
 
The district court conclude d that the patent “describes a well-known, 
and widely understood concept — at third part y guarantee of a sales 
transaction — and then applied that concept using conventional computer 
technology and the Internet.”69  Despite the “ancient lineage” of the claimed 
concept, i.e., creating a contractual relationship, the method claim may have 
still been patent eligible had its i nvocation of computers added something 
“inventive.”70  But it did not.  The district court found, and the Federal Circuit 
affirmed, that the paten ted invention did not require “any specific 
programming” and was not “tied to a ny particular machine.”71  In fact, 
according to the court, the claimed invention required nothing more than the 
“basic function of any general purpose computer.”72  That the claims required 
the transactions to be conducted online was ins ufficient to sa ve the claim 
because that merely applied the otherwise ancient and abstract concept to a  
“particular technological environment” (that is, the Internet).73 
In buySAFE, the Federal Circuit concluded that it i s not enough that 
“the transactions being guaranteed are themselves online trans actions” 
 
 67. buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 68. Id. at 1351. 
 69. Id. at 1352. (citing buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 964 F.Supp.2d 331, 335–36 (D.Del. 
2013)); see also, Accenture Global Servs. GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344-
45 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“generalized software components arranged to implement an abstract concept 
[of generating insurance-policy-related tasks based on rules to be completed upon the occurrence 
of an event] on a computer”); Bancorp Servs. LLC v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (US), 687 F.3d 
1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012)  (the computer “employed only for  its most basic function, the 
performance of repetitive calculations” to implement the idea of managing a life insurance policy). 
 70.  Id. at 1354–55. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 1352. 
 73.  Id. at 1355. 
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because, at best, that was simply an “attempt[] to limit the use” of the abstract 
guarantee idea “to a particular technological environment.”74 
On November 14, 2014,  the Federal Circuit reached a decision in  
Ultramerical, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC that expounded on the concept of providing 
familiar transactions over the Internet.  In Ultramerical, the plaintiff sued 
Hulu, LLC ( “Hulu”), YouTube, LLC ( “YouTube”), and WildTangent for 
infringement of a patent by distributing copyrighted media products over the 
Internet, where the consumer rec eives the copyrighted media at no cost in 
exchange for viewing an advertisement.75  After Hulu and YouTube were  
dismissed, WildTangent fi led for motion to dism iss for failure to state a 
claim, arguing that the asserted patent was ineligible subject matter, which 
the district court granted.   In the first r ound of appeal, the Federal Circuit 
reversed the order only to be vacated by the Supreme Court and re manded 
for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in 
Mayo Collaborative.  On remand, the Federal Circuit again concluded that the 
district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss under Section 101, and 
again WildTangent appealed.  While the petition for certiorari was pending, the 
Supreme Court issued Alice, vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision, and 
remanded it in light of Alice. 
In Ultramerical, the court distilled the heart of the asserted patent as an 
idea to “use [an ] advertisement as an exchange or currency,” “having no 
particular concrete or tangible form ” and “devoid of a concrete or tangible 
application.”76  This was step one in the Alice analysis.  The second step in 
the analysis considers the alleged novelty in implementing the abstract idea, 
that is, whether the claims do “significantly more” (i.e., “inventive concept”) 
than simply describe the abstract idea or method.  Here, Ultramerical argued 
that the asserted claims are “directed to a specific method of advertisement 
and content distribution that was previously unknown and never employed 
on the I nternet before.”  But the Fede ral Circuit rejected this argum ent 
ultimately finding nothing inventive about how the idea was i mplemented.  
Even Ultramerical’s invocation of the Internet did not save the claims from 
invalidity: 
 
Given the prevalence of the Internet, implementation of an abstract 
idea on the Internet i n this case is not  sufficient to provide any 
 
 74.  Id. at 1354–55. 
 75.  Ultramerical, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 76.  Id. at 715–16. 
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‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort 
designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’77 
 
The Supreme Court articu lated the pol icy against monopolizing the 
basic tools of scientific and technological work.78  The basic tools of modern 
day commercial and soc ial interaction, therefore, include the generic  
computer and the Internet, which hav e become “indispensable staples of  
contemporary life.”79 
Judge Mayer’s concurrence in Ultramerical, while not binding, not only 
emphasized Federal court’s wavering  deference to the Patent Office,  
particularly with regard to business method patents, but described a rule he 
refers to as the “tech nological arts test” to distinguish  between 
“entrepreneurial” versus “technological” innovation — an approach so me 
have characterized as a “ more thoughtful effort to ide ntify where the line 
would be drawn and why.”80 
Referring to Section 101 as the “gateway to the Patent Act,” Judge  
Mayer argues that determining patent eligibility “bears some hallmarks of a 
jurisdictional inquiry,” requiring earl y determination or risk tur ning any 
decision on validity or infringement into an i mpermissible advisory 
opinion.81  Further more, addressing patent  eligibility at the outset of 
litigation, according to Judge Mayer, “provides a bulwark against vexatious 
infringement suits,” calling out  “[t]hose who own vague and overbroad 
business method patents [that] often file ‘nearly identical patent infringement 
complaints against a plethora of diverse defendants,’ and then ‘demand . . . 
a quick settle ment at a price far lo wer than the cost to defend the 
litigation.’”82  Going hand in hand with discouraging vexatious litigation, is 
the public interest in eliminating defective patents that would otherwise stifle 
innovation.83 
 
 77.  Id. at 716 (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297). 
 78.  Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 79.  Ultramerical, 772 F.3d at 723 (Mayer, J., concurring). 
 80.  Guy W. Chambers, Ultramerical V. Hulu: The Guillotine For Patent Trolls, LAW360 
(Dec. 8, 2014, 10:17 AM) , http://www.law360.com/articles/601967/ultramercial-v-hulu-the-
guillotine-for-patent-trolls. 
 81.  Ultramerical, 772 F.3d at 718 (Mayer, J., concurring). 
 82.  Id. at 719 (citing Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see 
Fabio E. Marino & Teri H.P. Nguyen, Has Delaware Become the “New” Eastern District of Texas? The 
Unforeseen Consequences of the AIA, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH L.J. 527 (2014). 
 83.  Id. 
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For some time, these ineligible defective patents enjoyed a presumption 
of Section 101 eligibility because they were approved by the Patent Office in 
its expertise.  But, according to J udge Mayer, there should be no deference 
because the Patent Office has, for m any years, applied an “insufficiently 
rigorous subject matter eligibility standard,”84 as opposed to the current standard 
whose rigor the Supreme Court has confirmed through Alice, Myriad, Mayo, 
and Bilski.  In Judge Mayer’s view, claims directed to a n entrepreneurial 
objective, i.e., business method patents, are not only impermissibly abstract, but 
do not live up to the constitutional requirement that patent monopoly serve; “[t]o 
promote the progress of Science and useful Arts.”85  Judge Mayer articulated a 
test that he believed respected constitutional standards as well as Supreme Court 
scriptures under Alice and Bilski: 
 
[c]laims are impermissibly abstract if they are directed to an 
entrepreneurial objective, such as methods for in creasing revenue, 
minimizing economic risk, or struct uring commercial transactions, 
rather than a technological one.86 
 
Under Judge Mayer’s “technological arts” test, claims must: (1) Harness 
natural laws and scien tific principles; (2) Use them to solve seemingly 
intractable problems; (3) Describe a technological objective; and (4) Set out a 
precise set of instructions for achieving said technological objective. 
The requirement that precise implementation instructions be disclosed 
serves to “confine the reach of a patent, ensuring that the scope of the claims 
is commensurate with their technological disclosure.” 87  One commentator 
has referred to Judge Mayer’s concurrence as a “stronger doctrinal departure 
from the Alice-Mayo framework.”88  Indeed, applying Judge Mayer’s 
“technological arts” test would invariably put most if not all business method 
patents at risk of invalidity under Section 101. 
 
 84.  Id. at 720. 
 85.  U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8. 
 86.  Ultramerical, 772 F.3d at 721 (Mayer. J., concurring). 
 87.  Id. at 722; cf 35 U.S.C. §112 (2012) (requiring a written description, enablement, a nd 
definiteness). 
 88.  Farabow Henderson, Patent Eligibility in the Wake of Alice: Ultramerical III, FINNEGAN (Dec. 
4, 2014), http://www.finnegan.com/PatentEligibilityintheWakeofAliceUltramericalIII/. 
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IV.  The DDR Holdings Decision 
In DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, the majority affirmed the validity 
of two patents for webpage-display technology.89  The patents were directed 
to systems and methods of “generating a composite web page that combines 
certain visual ele ments of a ‘host’ website with content of  a t hird-party 
merchant,”90 preventing the host’s website visitor from being lured onto the 
website of the third-party merchant.  According the patentee, typically, when 
a visitor is on a host webpage and activates a hyperlink for an advertisement, 
the visitor is “instantly  transported away from the host’s website aft er 
‘clicking’ on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink.”91  The patented 
invention alters that “rou tine” process such that the visitor is no longer 
transported to the third-party merchant’s website upon clicking the 
hyperlinked advertisement.92  This, according to the majority, represented a 
patentable idea bec ause the claims “specify how i nteractions with the 
Internet are manipulated to yield the desired result — a result that overrides 
the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the 
click of a hyperlink.”93  Unlike in Ultramercial, the claims did not “merely 
recite the performance of som e business practice known from the pre-
Internet world along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet.” 94  
Rather, DDR’s patents presented an d addressed a “business challenge 
(retaining website visitors),” a cha llenge particular to the I nternet.95  The 
solution also defied the conventional ways the Internet is understood to work. 
Judge Mayer wrote a dissenting o pinion, stating that the patents were 
ineligible because it addressed an entrepreneurial problem and, thus, 
provided an entrepreneurial solution to be performed on the Internet.  For 
example, Judge Mayer characterized the patents as “simply tak[ing] a well-
known and widely applied business practice and applying it using a generic 
computer and the Internet.  The idea of having a ‘store within a store’ was in 
widespread use well befor e the dawn of e-co mmerce.”96  But the majority 
disagreed.  Instead, the majority picked up on the “ephemeral nature of 
 
 89.  DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
 90.  Id. at 1248. 
 91.  Id. at 1257. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 1258. 
 94.  Id. at 1257. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 1264 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
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Internet location and the near-instantaneous transport between locations 
made possible by standard Internet protocols,” and analogized the inventive 
concept of the patents to being “suddenly and completely transported” from 
one place (the host store) and being “relocated to a separate phy sical venue 
associated with the third party.”97  Even the inventor’s acknowledgement that 
the “innovative aspect of his claimed invention was ‘[t]aking something that 
worked in the real world and doi ng it on the Internet,”98 did not jeopardize 
its status at being patent-eligible subject matter. 
A.  Federal Circuit Decisions After DDR Holdings 
Before the year’s end, the Federal Circuit heard and decided one more 
case applying the Mayo/Alice’s two-step framework.  In Content Extraction 
& Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a patent infringement case filed by 
Content Extraction and Transmission LLC (“CET”).  Without discovery or 
claim construction, the dis trict court found the asserted patents invalid as  
patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. §101, and dismissed the allegations at the 
pleading stage.99  The patented technology is designed for ATMs, it permits 
the ATM to recognize infor mation written on a scanned check, such as the  
check’s amount, and populate certain data fields with that inform ation in a 
computer’s memory.100 
Viewed from a conceptual level, the court described the asserted claims 
as generally reciting a method of 1) extracting data from hard copy documents 
using an automated digitizing unit such as a scanner, and 2) recognizing specific 
information from the extracted data, and storing that information in a computer’s 
memory.101  In determining that the claims are drawn from abstract ideas, the 
court stated that the concept of “data collection, recognition, and storage is 
undisputedly well-known.  Indeed, humans have alway s performed these 
functions.”102  CET argued that the asserted claims are not drawn to an abstract 
idea because the claims require a computer and a scanner and “human minds are 
 
 97.  Id. at 1258. 
 98.  Id. at 1265. 
 99.  Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 
(Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 100.  Id. at 1345. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 1347. 
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unable to process and recognize the stream of bits output by a scanner.”103  These 
arguments were rejected. 
The Federal Circuit also agreed that the patented claims disclosed no 
“inventive concept” — a conclusion supported by CET’s concession at oral 
argument that the “use of a scanner or other digitizing device to extract data 
from a document was well-known at the time of filing, as was the ability to 
use computers to tra nslate the shapes of a physical page into typeface 
characters.”104 At most, the patent disclosed the implementation of an 
abstract idea using a scanner and computer in a “particular technological 
environment” (i.e., automated teller machines).105 
B.  Recent Federal Circuit Cases Focusing on the First Prong of Alice 
The impact concerning the ambiguity of the patentability of business 
methods has cast substantial uncertainty on software patents as a whole.  In 
part, this is due to the fact that neither the Supreme Court, nor the Federal 
Circuit has given explicit guidance on what qualifies as an abstract idea.  
Instead, the only clues to the scope of the abstract idea exception to 
patentability reside in the anecdotal evidence of the cases decided since 
Alice.  Indeed, the sole CAFC case that sustained patentability of a software 
patent over a Sec. 101 challenge, DDR Holdings, did so, not because the 
claims were not drawn to an abstract idea, but because the claims added 
enough to the abstract idea to justify patentability.  It appears that software 
patents directed to performing on computer activities previously performed 
by humans are unlikely to survive. 
Additionally, none of the cases that survived the Alice analysis did so 
based on the first prong of the analy sis, patent-eligibility was deter mined 
exclusively based on the second prong.  Fortunately, after nearly two years of 
finding that the first prong of the Alice test was met in every case presented, the 
Federal Circuit issued a series of decisions that provided more guidance on what 
is not an abstract idea for purposes of an Alice analysis. 
On May 12, 2016, the Federal Circuit held that software that improves 
computer technology is not abstract, recognizing that “[s]oftware can make 
non-abstract improvements to co mputer technology just as hardware 
improvements can.”106  Enfish involved patents related to a “self-referential” 
 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 1348. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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database that the district court found, on summary judgment, invalid under, 
inter alia, Sec. 101 because the cl aims were directed to the abstract idea of  
“storing, organizing, and retrieving memory in a l ogical table,” in ot her 
words, “the concept of organizing information using tabular form ats.”107  
The Federal Circuit disagreed, as Judge Hughes explained: 
 
We do not read Alice to broadly hold that all improvements in 
computer-related technology are inherently abstract and, therefore, 
must be considered at step two. Indeed, some improvements in 
computer-related technology wh en appropriately claimed are 
undoubtedly not abstract, such as a chip architecture, an LED display, 
and the like. Nor do we t hink that claims directed to software, as 
opposed to hardware, are inherently abstract and therefore only 
properly analyzed at the second step of the Alice analysis. Software 
can make non-abstract improvements to computer technology just as 
hardware improvements can, and sometimes the improvements can 
be accomplished through either route. We thus see no reason to 
conclude that all claims directed to improvements in computer-
related technology, including those directed to software, are abstract 
and necessarily analyzed at the second step of Alice, nor do we 
believe that Alice so directs. Therefore, we find it relevant to ask 
whether the c laims are directe d to an improvement to computer 
functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea, even at the first 
step of the Alice analysis.108 
 
The Court held that the Enfish patents were not “directed to an abstract 
idea within the meaning of Alice.  Rather, they are directed to a  specific 
improvement to the way computers operate, embodied in the self-referential 
table.”109  For example, unlike the relational model, the patents “disclose[d] 
an indexing technique that allows for faster searching of data than would be 
possible with the relationship model . . . allow[ed] for more effective storage 
of data other than structured text, such as images and unstructured text . . . 
[and] more flexibility in configuring the database.” 110 In other wor ds, the 
Federal Circuit read the  claims as not only being “directed to an 
improvement to com puter functionality,” but also “to a specific 
 
 107.  Id. at 1337. 
 108.  Id. at 1335. 
 109.  Id. at 1336. 
 110.  Id. at 1333. 
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implementation of a solution to a proble m in the software art s.” 111  The 
Enfish patents survived. 
A few weeks later, on June 27, 2016, the Federal Circuit issued another 
Sec. 101 motion in BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T 
Mobility, LLC, writing the opinion, Judge Chen (who also wrote the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in DDR Holdings), vacated the district court’ s order 
dismissing plaintiff’s complaint finding that the claims of the asserted patent, 
U.S. Patent No. 5,987,606 were invalid as a matter of law under Sec. 101.112  
The patent described its invention as “combining the advantages of the then-
known filtering tools while avoiding their drawbacks.”113  For example, the 
invention avoids being “modified or thwarted by a computer literate end-user” 
and “avoids being installed on and dependent on ‘individual end-user hardware 
and operating systems’” or a single local area network or local server platform 
by installing the filter at the ISP server.114 
The patent was deemed eligible by the Federal Circuit despite its claims 
involving elements known in the art.  For the Federal Circuit, “an inventive 
concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement 
of known, conventional pieces.”115  Here, the patent, described a “ specific, 
discrete implementation of the abstract idea of filtering content”  on th e 
internet, even though filter ing content on the internet was already a known 
concept, the patent described how its “particular arrangement of elements is 
a technical improvement over prior art way s of filtering such content.” 116  
This, according to the Federal Circuit is patentable under Sec. 101.117 
Subsequently, on August 1, 2016, the Federal Circuit ruled on Electric 
Power Group LLC v. Alstom S.A., here the Federal Circuit held that patents 
describing systems and methods for  performing real-time performance 
monitoring of an electric power grid by collecting data from multiple data 
sources, analyzing the data, and displaying the results to be ineligible patent 
subject matter.118  Unlike the claims in Enfish, which involved improvements 
to computer functionality, the assert ed claims in Electric Power were 
 
 111.  Id. at 1338–39. 
 112.  BASCOM Global Internet Services v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 113.  Id. at 1344. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 1350. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
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focused on independentl y abstract id eas that merely use computers as 
tools.119  The Federal Circuit further noted that merely limiting such asserted 
claims to the particular technological environment of power-grid monitoring 
is, without more, insufficient to transform the claims into  “patent-eligible 
applications of the abstract ideas.”120  Indeed, there was nothing new about 
the asserted claims: “The claims in this case do not even require a new source 
or type of information, or new techniques for analyzing it.”121  Even under 
the second Alice step, t he Federal Circuit observed that the clai ms’ 
“invocation of computers, networks, and displays,” in fact, required neither 
“nonconventional computer, network, or displa y components” nor “non-
conventional and non-g eneric arrangement of known, conventional 
pieces.”122  In so holding, Power Electric spoke favorably about the district 
court’s “common-sense distinction between ends sought an d particular 
means of achieving them, between desired results (functions) and particular 
ways of achieving (perfor ming) them” as a one helpful way  of double-
checking patentability under Alice, specifically the Suprem e Court’s 
prohibition against the pr eemptive nature of patent s.123  Judge Tarant o 
reasoned that “clai ms [that are] so result-focused, so functional, as to 
effectively cover any  solution to an id entified problem” is more likely to 
preempt innovation.124 
The concern for preemption took center stage in McRO Inc. v. Bandai 
Namco Games America Inc., a case involvi ng patents on a utomatically 
animating lip synchronization and facial expression of three-dimensional 
characters.  The district court invalidated the patents, finding the clai ms 
“drawn to the [abstract] idea of automated rules-based use of morph targets 
and delta sets for li p-synchronized three-dimensional animation.”125  First, 
looking facially at the claims, the dist rict court f ound them directed to 
something tangible as “each cover[ed] an approach to autom ated three-
dimensional computer animation, which is a  specific technological 
process.”126  Because  the cl aims described a tangible process, the  court 
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 121.  Id. at 1355. 
 122.  Id. (cf. Enfish and BASCOM). 
 123.  Id. at 1356. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  McRO Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., No. 2015-1080, 2016 WL 4896481, 
at 7 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 126.  Id. at 4. 
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disregarded the preem ption concern.127  Second, the court compared the 
claims to the  prior art  that the patent s ought to improve in an  attempt to 
“factor out conventional activity.”128  In the prior art, facial expressions and 
lip synchronizations were done manually with the help of a computer.  The 
animator, using a com puter, would manually determine the ap propriate 
modification to be performed on a character model at certain important times 
or “keyframes.”129  Here, the patents aimed to automate the 3-D animator’s 
tasks by “providing an integrated method embodied in co mputer 
software . . . for the rapid, efficient lip synchronization and manipulation of 
character facial expressions.”130  Although the district court concluded that 
“the claim adds to the prior art . . . the use of rules, rather than artists” to set 
the proper modifications or “m orph weights and transitions  between 
phonemes,” the court nonetheless invalidated the patents because the claims 
were too broad and not limited to specific rules.131  The court found that the 
claims were unpatentable because “the novel portions of [the] invention are 
claimed too broadly.”132  The Federal Circuit disagreed. 
Criticizing the district court’s Sec. 101 analysis as one that  “loosely 
tracks” the Alice test, Judge Reyna, writing for the Court, reversed the order 
for judgment on t he pleading an d held that the clai ms are patentable.133  
Addressing the district court’s analysis, the McRO made clear that tangibility 
is not dispositive.  Indeed, “the result may not be tangible, there is nothin g 
that requires a method “be tied to a machine or transform an  article” to be 
patentable.134  “The concern underl ying the exceptions to § 1 01 is n ot 
tangibility, but preemption.”135  Here, the “claimed process uses a combined 
order of specific rules that renders info rmation into a specific format that is 
then used and applied to create desired results: a sequence of synchronized, 
animated characters.”136  The district court oversimplified the asserted claims 
by looking at them generally and then f ailing to account for those specific 
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requirements of the claims.137  When the Federal Circuit did so, it concluded 
that the asserted clai ms were, in fact, “lim ited to rules with specifi c 
characteristics,” that is, “li mited to rules with certain co mmon 
characteristics, i.e. a genus.”138  Now, “[c]laims to the genus of an invention, 
rather than a particular species , have long be en acknowledged as 
patentable.”139  However, “ [p]atent law has evolved to place additional 
requirements on patentees seeking to claim a genus; however, these limits 
have not been in relation to the abstract idea exception to §101.”140  Rather, 
the limits have been in relation to the risk of pree mption — th e primary 
concern driving Sec. 101 jurisprudence.  Because, the McRO patents, when 
“looked at as a whole,” are “directed to a pat entable, technological 
improvement over the existing, manua l 3-D ani mation techniques,” there 
was no risk of preemption.141 
At first blush, there is no doubt t hat the McRO decision reiterated the 
core principles espoused in Alice and its pr ogeny, namely, that claims 
directed to specific im provements in co mputer technology are patent-
eligible.  However, recall that the underlying theme of Alice jurisprudence is 
a presumption of ineligibility where the  patent claims a process that can be 
carried out by a human using pen and paper by simply automating it.142 In 
OIP Technologies, the Federal Circuit  affirmed the district court’ s order 
invalidating patents that relate to a method of p rice optimization in an  
e-commerce environment.  “At best,”  Judge Hughe s writes, “th e claims 
describe the automation of the fundamental economic concept of offer-based 
price optimization through the use of generic-com puter functions.”143 
Indeed, the “key distinguishing feature of the claims is the ability to automate 
or otherwise make more efficient traditional price-optimization methods.”144  
The Federal Circuit held that “relying on a computer to perform routine tasks 
more quickly or m ore accurately is insufficient to render a claim  patent 
eligible.”145  Prior to McRO, it appeared the automation of human processes 
 
 137.  Id. at 7. 
 138.  Id. at 7–8. 
 139.  Id. at 8 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980)). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. at 10. 
 142.  See, e.g., OIP Technologies v. Amazon.com, 788 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 143.  Id. at 1363. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
ALICE - FINAL_TOMLASTLOOK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2016  2:41 PM 
28 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1 
 
was not patentable.  However, under McRO, the automation of an animator’s 
tasks seems patent eligible so long as concerns of preemption are addressed. 
V.  Conclusion 
Initially, the Federal Ci rcuit’s post-Alice jurisprudence carefully 
avoided drawing bright-line tests, instead deciding individual cases under the 
specific facts of those cases, with subsequent cases being argued by analogy 
to previously decided cases.  At last, after over two y ears of p ost-Alice 
decisions, the broad strokes of an analy tical framework are st arting to 
emerge, particularly from the Federal Circuit’s decisions over the last six 
months.  First, the Court will determine what distinguishes the invention 
from the prior art.  If the novel feature is the use of a com puter, the patent 
will likely be invalid, whil e if the novel feature is a better com puter, the 
patent will likely be valid. 
Whether the Federal Circuit will continue to follow this path or change 
course and attempt to harmonize past decisions into an analytical framework 
(e.g., by attempting to define the boundaries of what constitutes an abstract 
idea) remains to be seen and will be the subject of continuing analysis and 
research by practitioners for years to come. 
 
